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A New Wave Dialectic·
The Reinvention of Human Embryology
by

C. Ward Kischer, Ph.D.

The author is Associate Professor Emeritus of Anatomy at the University of
Arizona, Col/ege of Medicine, Tucson, AZ.
In 1973 Roe v. Wade was adjudicated by the Supreme Court. This landmark
decision proved to be the watershed between science and the law. Statements
made within the decision, and since, concerning human development, have been
disingenuous, irresponsible or deliberately deceitful.
One would like to believe that Supreme Court Justices, acting as learned and
wise servants of our society, exercise great and considerate care in making
decisions that not only affect our daily lives, but impact the evolution of our
culture in the most moral and responsible way. We also want to believe they seek
out all available facts concerning a case before coming to decisions. Alas, such is
not the case.

Justice Blackmun: The Roe and Webster Decisions
It is clear that Attorneys Jay Floyd (before the Court of7) and Robert Flowers
(before the Court of 9), arguing for the unborn during Roe v. Wade were
unprepared in biological knowledge to answer Justice Blackmun's questions
about the beginning of life, and when a fetus becomes a person. Blackmun,
himself, was (and still is) woefully ignorant of the concept of "biological life".
Unable to come to terms with the ordinary understanding of life as a biological
life he confused the issue by including a question to Flowers, concerning when a
fetus becomes a person, "a religious person, a medical person, a philosophical
person". If personhood implies, at all, a usefullness, a newborn would be no more
a person than the fertilized ovum!
Nevertheless, Blackmun eventually concluded that those in "medicine,
philosophy, and theology" could not come to a consensus as to "when life
begins". This was intellectual dishonesty at its worst. 2
Justice Blackmun failed to become properly informed by the time he wrote the
decision for the Webster case (1989), because he depended upon an amici curiae
brief in which 167 "distinguished scientists" concluded: "there is no scientific
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consensus that a human life begins at conception, at a given stage of fetal
development, or at birth."3
This statement misleads the reader. They use the term "conception" only in a
biological sense. What follows from conception, biologically, is a continuum,
which, realistically, never ceases. Thus, a biological life is defined by its inception
and destiny, both of which are inseparable and interdependent. It follows, then,
that under conditions which we have come to understand as normal, there is no
point of arbitration, even after birth and unto death. Therefore, interposing
"stages" which purport to have meaning for biological development are wholly
arbitrary, specious and disingenuous at best. All of development, therefore, from
first contact between sperm and ovum is a fait accompli
The amici further state: the beginning of a human life "cannot be answered by
reference to scientific principles." They then invoke more than a biological
consideration by stating that the answer "will depend on each individual's social,
religious, philosophical, ethical and moral beliefs and values."
If these kinds oflives are assigned to an embryo or fetus, they would be done so
arbitrarily. If they are acquired, this would occur as a learned belief or value long
after birth!
But, their statement removes the biological imperative; therefore, they
compound their own prouncement and, in effect, pose a problem of "life" for.-the
newborn, infant,juvenile, and, in fact, for any age of an individual. In point of fact,
scientific principles can and do define when life begins (for the new individual),
simply by recording the results of each pregnant woman, the issue of which we
know is derived from a union of sperm and ovum! The question is, and has been,
answered, repeatedly, over the time of many thousands of years, ever since
hominids first appeared on the earth.
The same amici make still another profoundly gratuitious statement: "The
question of when a human life truly begins calls for a conclusion as to which
characteristics define the essence of human life. While science can tell us when
certain biological characteristics can be detected, science cannot tell us which
biological (sic) attributes establish the existence of a human being."
Here, the amici do not equivocate the biological imperative, as they did when
asking when a human life begins. They cannot have it both ways.
Wendell M. Stanley, Nobel Prize winner and discoverer ofthe tobacco mosaic
virus, stated it clearly:
The essence of life is the ability to reproduce. This is accomplished by the utiliution of
energy to create order out of disorder, to bring together into a specific predetermined
pattern from semiorder or even from chaos all the component parts of that pattern with
the perpetuation of that pattern with time. This is life. 4

It is important to know that of the 167 "distinguished scientists", cited in the
above mentioned amici curiae brief, only 31 had "index-described" terms related
to embryology, that is, "development" or "developmental" being used in part of
the descriptions of their fields. However, only one (1) of those 31 was a self-defined
embryologist, and that one not even as a human embryologist!
Obviously, there is a major problem. The Roe v. Wode decision was regarded as
November, 1994
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a decision that legalized abortion within the first two trimesters, by rendering it a
private matter between doctor and patient. But, it was much more than that,
because it indirectly declared the embryo and fetus up to the time of "viability"
(assumed to be, but not declared as such, approximately 24 weeks postfertilization) a non-person! Justice Blackrnun believes the issue is resolved.
Interviewed on ABC Nightline, on 2 December, 1993, ANATOMY OF A
DECISION: Roe v. Wade, he stated: "the basic issue is decided ... the
constitutional issue is decided, and not on moral grounds."
It is disturbing that Blackrnun would separate "constitutional" from "moral".
There is an axiom which used to be taught in law which says: ALL LAW COMES
FROM MORAL LAW. Although sophisticated pundits of the law would now
argue this, a reading of the history of law would confirm it.
Blackmun later made this statement: "I'd like to think I've written into /aw[sic]
other significant decisions, but one gets tagged with one - and, there it is." I have
always believed that the Supreme Court is not supposed or empowered to write
into law (making law), but to interpret law. Is it not the function of the legislative
branch of government to make, or write law?
The Fallout From The Court's Decisions
The Supreme Court has had several chances to reconsider the effects of Roe v.
Wade, the latest efforts being the cases of J.M, Individually v. v.c., et aL, and
Alexander Loce v. The State of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of The United
States, in its October Term, 1993, elected not to hear those cases.
Still to be decided by the high court are the crucial questions of (1) when legal
life begins, (2) when establishment of the individual (personhood) occurs, and (3)
will there be an invocation of equal protection under the law (14th amendment)
for the embryo and fetus. The Roe Court, and subsequent Courts in the cases of
Webster, Akron and Casey have not addressed these questions; but more
importantly, the biology - the HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY - referred to in those
cases was in error. For the benefit of the Supreme Court, a proper dialogue has
never taken place!
Since Roe v. Wade, there has been an inundation of one-sided monologues,
appearing in lay and scientific publications, newspapers, interviews, talk shows,
virtually all forms of media, calling into question the quality and status of the
embryo and early fetus--especially by persons with no experience, training and
little knowledge of human embryology. Why do they do this if the Roe decision
essentially obviated, forever, as Blackrnun believes, claims of personhood prior to
"viability", arid confirmed the seeming finality of a woman's right for an abortion?
It appears the answer is that most of the proponents of choice know that they
successfully prevented the biological truth from entering into the Court hearings
and decisions, and,.anticipating that eventually this truth would out, have been
rewriting human development by skewing, distorting and outright lying about the
known facts, and by constructing an intellectually dishonest social policy
concerning human development, most of which has gone unchallenged in the
more common media sources.
68

Linacre Quarterly

l

Oifford Grobstein and the Preembryo

One of the most active and prolific contributors to this problem is Clifford
Grobstein, who is a developmental biologist, not a human embryologist, and who
is a member of The American Fertility Society. In addition, he has authored a
book, entitled Science and The Unborn, subtitled: "Choosing Human Futures"
(Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1988).6 He writes articles for lay publications, is
interviewed by others, such as Psychology Today, and promotes his ideas about
human development through computer networks, aU without challenge. He also
may have invented the termpreemhryo~ a term which has been and is being used
to reduce the status of the eady embryo to that of a non-person and non-human.
He identifies his most active professional area as "public policy". He has had
some success in politicizing human embryology and even in finding some allies
among, of all places, the scientific world of Human Embryology, who are willing
to inject his "New Wave" definitions into the jargon of human development. Keith
Moore, who is an author of several texts on human embryology, poses a question
on page 71 of the third edition of: Before We Are Born (W.B. Saunders Co.,
Philadelphia, 1988)8 asking: "When does the embryo become human?" On the
next page he gives two answers, the scientific one and the political one, then asks
the student to choose between them! However, it must be said in his latest edition
( 1994) he still gives the two answers but does not ask the student to choose
between them. In addition to that, Moore, in his latest (5th) edition of The
Developing HUmfln (W.B. Saunders, Co., Philadelphia, 1993)9 uses for the first
time, albeit in a contradictory way, the term preembryo, a political reference to the
first week of human development. This is the first recorded use of the term in a
textbook of human embryology! Interestingly, however, when this author
protested use of the term to Moore, he admitted his use of the term "was
inappropriate" and said he would remove it in the next printing.
Grobstein obviously agrees with Blackmun, concerning the presumed finality of
the Roe decision, because now Grobstein writes about the futures he has planned
for the aborted individuals in ever more confident tones, but, again, without
apparent dialogue!
He is, perhaps, the leading spokesman for "choice", but prefers to identify it as
"public policy", and a leading sponsor of human embryo "research". Grobstein is
the avant-garde of those reinventing human development, and those writing a new
social policy for the status of the new individual.
Grobstein's New Wave Embryology and Future Social Policy

He has written a chapter in a book entitled Ethical Issues in Research, edited by
Darwin Cheney and published by The University Publishing Group, Inc.,
Frederick, Maryland (1993).10 This chapter seems to bring together his previous
manipulations of the science of human embryology with his intended uses and
disposal of "materials" important to our human futures, under the guise of a New
Wave social policy. That policy is predicated on reinvented science.
Therefore, a careful critique of what he says is requisite, if for no other reason
but to inform an unsuspecting public as to the direction our evolution might take us.
November, 1994
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Only a well-informed public can apply the necessary pressure to restore the proper
reverence for human development.
Our culture is at stake. The evolution of our society and, indeed, the very root of
societal endurance, its moral base, is being redefined, virtually by fiat. There must
be reasonable dialogue, and those properly prepared in science without a political
agenda must be heard, lest once more science becomes darkened with demonic
doctrines.
Herein, is the critique of Grobstein's New Wave human embryology, and
futuristic social policy with appropriate excerpts from his chapter on "The Status
and Uses of Early Human Development Stages":

• The funding pattern for human embryo research
"The focus of this chapter is on the moral and legal status of early human
developmental stages, with emphasis on how these stages should be treated in
laboratories and in clinical practice . . . With regard to the topic of research on
early human development, this chapter will direct attention to the moral
considerations that exert external directive pressure on research, its funding, and its
outcomes . . . What is not so immediately obvious is the extremely limited funding
(approaching zero) currently available from US federal sources for studies on
early human developmental stages. Moreover, the dearth of such funds clearly is
not accidental; rather it is traceable to deliberate policy of the Federal Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) ... the existing funding pattern strongly
suggests that understanding of early human development is of far less interest and
importance than that of other species such as, say, the mouse."

Not so. The funding pattern has been. and is, relatively low because of
medical, legal and ethical restrictions concerning acquisitions of human
embryonic or fellJl tissues. In spite of the many abortions performed each
year, most are performed in clinics on early stages of embryos by saline
treatment or mechanical disruption which destroys the embryo or early
fetuses, and ofter: renders the tissue unusable. ProCurement ofthe best and
most viable tissues would mean surgical interventiolL Most physicians and
patients are unwilling to undergo such a radical procedure. However,
since President Clinton has lifted the ban on funding of fetal tissue
research, and the NIH is cu"ently conducting hearings on ethical and
moral considerations of human embryo research, funding is likely to
rapidly increase.
"Moreover, reference to the next millennium is not incidental. I refer to it because
in this research area religious teachings exert significant pressure on US funding
-even though the issues involved are certainly not solely religious, and teachings of
various religions are hardly always concordant on the matters involved."

Left out ofthis statement are the legal restrictions. These are not going
to be removed, easily, or at all They may be explained by the age-old
legal maxim:alllaw comes from mora/law, and moral imperatives
have their origin in religiolL To remove the moral basisfor restrictions is to
70
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remove virtually all restrictive control for society. What then would be
left? - a kind of social anarchy which would declare that the end justifies
the means.
Acquisition ofearly embryos andfetuses from in utero and even in vitro
fertilization followed by CUlturing through early stages has been restricted
because ofthe revered quality traditionally applied to the new individual
and because of the self-imposed restrictions by physicians applying the
technique solely in cases of fertility problems. However, if a different
quality can be applied, it is likely to be followed with a different value.
".. . Defenders of current restrictive policies on funding for research on early
human developmental stages argue that because human abortuses constitute a
possible source of study materials, increases in the number of authorized and
funded early human studies will promote a higher frequency of abortion."

And this is true, not only for "a possible source ofstudy materials': but
for many experimental procedures. "60 minutes" ran a piece in 1993
about a clinic in Russia set up to make fetal cell and tissue injections into
children afflicted with Down ssyndrome. One part ofthis clinic was given
over to free elective abortions. The fetus was removed alive, dissected and
living tissue preserved for experimental injections. The fact that this
occu"ed in Russia does not preclude the likelihood of similar clinics or
operations eventually appearing in this country. In fac~ at least two
diseases are regarded as lending themselves to fetal cell or tissue implants
for therapeutic relief, albeit temporary at best· 1) Parkinson's, and 2)
Diabetes mellitus. Only living cells can afford any benefit Therefore the
best assurance for that is the livingfetus, and the modelfor the use ofthose
has already been established by the Swedes, 1/, 12
"To others, aware of the issue, this argument is tenuous at best; it is little more
persuasive than the suggestion that wider research use of adult human tissues will
increase the frequency of capital punishment. In both instances, an unjustified
conflation of unsubstantiated assertions is claimed to demonstrate causal
connections that are then advanced as though they were objective fact."

Unsubstantiated assertions converted to objective fact have actually
been the rather high-profile domain ofClifford Grobstein and others, e.g.
claims to different "stages of individuality': 5, 13 inferences that human
embryos display "gill slits and tails': 14 and invoking "thought" occurring
at 30 weeks of age postfertilization. 15
• New .((nowledge through new experiments on human embryos
"Rather than such loose logic, what seems to be needed at this point is careful
evaluation of the potential gains and losses if early human developmental stages were
more accessible to scientific study. I will provide an appraisal along these lines, based
on a preliminary analysis which, persuasive to me, proves that under appropriate
oversight and with suitable safeguards early human developmental stages should be
available to gain otherwise unobtainable important new knowledge."
November, 1994
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It is only fair to ask, at this point, how important the "unobtainable new
knowledge" might be. To date, no human embryologist is advocating
experimentation with human embryos. Grobstein is a developmental
biologist Experimenting with venebrate and invenebrate embryos is pan
of the discipline of developmental biologists. They are tinkerers, fiddlers,
and doodlers, the contemporary biological engineers. Now they propose
for human embryos what they previously have done as a career discipline.
The problem is they see linle, if any, distinction between human embryos
and those of other venebrates.
". .. the zygote is genetically a new formulation capable of producing a lineage
of like cells in a multicellular individual."

Read: "the zygote is genetically a new formulation. . . " as: ': .. a new
individual . . . ': To accept Grobstein sdescription would. at least, require
him to arbitrarily decide how many cells establishes the new multicellular
individual
"However, the significance of these facts as stated are the subject of major
controversy and, from my point of view, are substantially misinterpreted by some
commentators who insist on regarding the resulting genetic individual as
immediately equivalent to the total individuality of an adult."

What kind of significance is Grobstein talking about, and the "facts"
are significant to whom? - the new individual or those wanting to
intervene in development of this new individual?
"Accordingly, these commentators declare the zygote to be a "person" in the full
moral and legal sense. Other commentators however, reject this notion as naive
and misguided, pointing out that - like the preformationism of more than a
century ago - the interpretation grossly miniaturizes and distorts the significance
of the subsequent development process."

This is a good technique by Grobstein, tieing a moral and a legal
interpretation to a biological one, then comparing it to a discredited false
theory of more than 300 years ago. In effect, he characterizes those
claiming full "personhood" for the zygote as charlatans.
"The fact, of course, is that during development the established genetic
individuality is translated and transformed through step-wise expression into the
much more complex reality of the new generation."

Just as it continues from newborn to adult to old age to death.
"The zygote does have important characteristics beyond those of either egg or
sperm alone. But the zygote also lacks many key features of a person, which are
readily identified in a newborn and even more clearly in an adult".
Which means that the newborn also lacks "many key features" of an
adult!
• Cloning and the new individual
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"To be more specific (and extrapolating from studies on other species) the
single-celled zygote is not yet even committed to becoming one individual. As it
divides to form a small cluster of cells, each derived cell - if separated from the
others - can make a whole new individual."
No properly constructed experiments have, as ye~ been performed on
human embryos to provide evidence for this assertion. So-called cloning of
human embryos was reported in Science l6 (not via a research
publication) from the work of Hall and Stillman, but does not provide
evidence for several reasons: 1) the embryos chosen were those from 2 to 8
cell stages and they were chromosomally abnormal embryos (mu/tip/oidys
with an extra set ofchromosomes). 2) Separated blastomeres were grown
through only the nextfew divisions, which would have occurred naturally,
anyway, and 3) there still is no evidence that the blastomeres are exactly
equivalen~ which is the definition of a clone.
Commitment towards one individual may well have taken place at
fertilization,· then, again, it may not have. Grobstein draws a conclusion
based on many experiments performed on several other species, most of
them from Sea Urchin embryos. What he is describing is known to
embryologists as "determinant or indeterminant cleavage': In the latter
case, determination occurs late in cleavage thereby preserving
plUripotentiality in the blastomeres of early embryos. In the former case,
the opposite would be true, thereby obviating the pluripotentiality early in
development It is postulated that peptides or proteins, acting as
determinants are released at the proper time to determine differentiation.
The truth is no "determinants" have ever been identified in the case of
humans. Therefore, it is not known if, in fac~ blastomeres of early
embryos contain "determinants" which mayor may not be inhibited,
suppressed or masked, or that they may be added only at a later stage, say
at the stage ofthe primitive streak, about 14 days, post-fertilization (P-F).
If a suppressor or inhibitor is suspected, then similarly, one must propose
appearance ofan agent to remove or override the suppressor or inhibitor.
The truth is, there is no evidence to support any of this speculation.
What is definitely known is that 30% of all monozygotic twins are
determined early in developmen~ at the first 2 or 3 division stages P-F. 17
This fact conflicts directly with Grobstein s claim that singleness does not
occur until the onset ofthe primitive streak. Furthermore, Grobstein raises
the case of monozygotic twins which occurs in only 1 of every 270 live
births. He offers no account as to when singleness would occur for the
other 269 individuals.
"The result is equivalent to natural twinning, which, of course, occurs with low but
regular frequency in human development and produces litters of genetically
identical individuals in armadillos. Genetic individuality, therefore, is not the same
as developmental individuality; instead, the one precedes the other."
Genetic and developmental individuality are two of six arbitarily
invented 'stages" by Grobstein, which support his speciol theories.
November, 1994
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His so-called "developmental individuality" can be identical with
"genetic individuality" because it is known that approximlltely 30% of
monozygotic twins are derivedfrom the first two cleavage divisions - the
two or four cell stage.
Further, Grobstein is applying a condition for
cases of human
development based on what is known to occur in only 1 ofabout every 385
live births.
Lastly, "developmental individuality" does not have to be the same as
"genetic individuality" in order to identify a new individual After all, any
succeeding moment is not the same as any preceding moment. The
significance is not that they are different but that one follows the other
because all ofdevelopment is a continuum. bome from a fait accompli
initUzted by first contact of sperm with ovum.

an

"Furthermore, as cell division proceeds, the many cells produced aggregate as a
collective that develops a central fluid-filled cavity within an outer cellular
peripheral wall. By this stage, the developing entity has normally travelled down
the oviduct and arrived in the uterus. There, its outer cells interact with the uterine
lining, leading to its implantation or incorporation into the uterine wall. In this
process, the peripheral cells of the developing entity do not become part of, or
contribute to, the embryo proper - defined as the direct precursor to the new
individual-to-be. Rather, the outer cells of this stage contnbute to the early
placenta - the organ of exchange with the mother - which normally is discarded
at birth."
The evidence is not conclusive to substantiate Grobstein'S claim that
"the outer cells" do not contribute to the embryo proper. Virtually all
human embryology texts up to the present time, have stated that the "outer
cells': spec. the cytotrophoblast contribute cells which eventually cover
the lining cells of the primitive gut. Carlson's new text, 18 indicates the
covering of the cells of the gut come from the gut itself. However, this is
true for the monkey, but no study has been done for the human. Larsen's
new text states that the origin of the covering cells, the extraembryonic
mesoderm. is, as yet still theory. 19 It really makes no difference. In
actuality, those outer cells are acting on behalf of the embryo proper. If
they do not, the embryo will die. It is difficult, ifnot impossible, to see how
Grobstein can so easily separate the two functionally, as if one exists
without the other.

"Therefore, the cellular aggregate produced by eady divisions of the zygote is
better referred to as a pre-embryo than as an embryo."
Nonsense. Many ofthe cells in the early cluster are destined to become
part of the embryo proper. We simply don't know which ones they are.
One might reasonably theorize that as mitotic divisions continue, an outer
layer is distinguished from inner cells. However, it is not known whether
or not this positioning is static or if, in fact some cells change places with
others. In fact in a two-cell stage, no one knows if one or both of these
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cells will eventually become part of the embryo proper or only the
'1eeding" layer, as Grobstein puts it Nevertheless, cells of the "embryo
proper" certainly appear long before implanllltion!
The term pre-embryo is pure invention. arbitrary and probably was
introduced by Clifford Grobstein in a 1979 article in Scientific
American. 7 Traditionally, all of the early stages derived from the
fertilized zygote have been regarded as the embryo, and this is confirmed
by contemporary authors such as Carlson. Larsen and O'Rahilly. Ronan
O'Rahilly, in fact, has a footnote in his 1992 text in which he states: "The
ill-defined and inaccurate term pre-embryo . .. is said to end with . .. the
primitive streak . . . the term is not used in this book. "20
"It is only somewhat later that the actual precursor cells of the embryo - and the
eventual human adult-become conspicuously separate from the so-called
trophoblast (feeding layer), which contributes to the placenta."
The cells and tissues of the "embryo proper" are not "conspicuously"
separated from the so-called trophoblast There is a contiguity of tissues
which joins the embryo with the placenta, most importantly, the blood
vessels which grow from the embryo proper to close approximation with
maternal blood lakes in the uterus via the placenta.
"(Interestingly, the trophoblast cells sometimes escalate on their own, undergoing
malignant transformation, and take the life of either the mother, the offspring, or
both.)"

The same may happen from cells of the "embryo proper" in the form of
teratomas.
• Status: preembryos are pre-persons?
"What should be the status of the developing entity of the pre-embryonic stage?
I prefer the following tentative approach to this important and difficult question.
By virtue of its earlier developmental activation, the pre-embryo has potential to
become a person in the full sense. This means that it has among its alternative
futures possible maturation into a person. It is, in this sense, a preperson and this
must be taken into account in its treatment and status."
Heroes are often artifically made by erecting straw men. then knocking
them down in public view. Unfortunately, this is what Grobstein is doing
by promoting this false concept ofa "pre-embryo ': then lamenting: what
should be done with it? As many human embryologists (as Grobstein may
have supporters) will claim there is no such stage as the "pre-embryo':
The basic reason is that such artificial stages are significant only to the
extant political discourse. It is ofno value to human development because
all of development from fertilization to birth (and beyond) is a
continuum. As such, it is supreme evidence of the Jait accompli begun
by initial contact ofthe sperm and ovum. Most importantly, under normal
conditions the continuum of development is not subject to any intrinsic
November, 1994
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arbitration!
"What might such a status entail? First, since we should and do attach very high
value to persons (in part because the category includes each of us as a self) and
pre-persons are the only source of persons, every feasible opportunity and priority
should be provided to pre-persons to continue their development to personhood.
However, this does not require and does not mean that pre-persons are
automatically and immediately persons. Rather, it means that appropriate
formulation of the status and rights of pre-persons is a task of high priority, taking
into account the status and rights of the mother."

It would seem that once a straw man is constructed it can arbitrarily be
given a heart, a brain and courage, at some arbitraryfuture time. Thus, the
straw man is now a "pre-person".
"Second, pre-persons, as genetic individuals, are members of the kinship network
of both of their parents. In the absence of the genetic parents as decision makers at a
critical time, an agreed-upon procedure for surrogate custodianship should exist
within each human community, whether it is applied to a particular subgroup
(family) or to a larger community having a reliably stable consensus within it."

It is interesting that Grobstein admits to the derivation and
subsequent decision making, of "pre-persons" through both parents. In
fact, an equal consideration ofa genetic fathers vested interest in the fate
of embryos and fetuses (Grobstein's pre-person) was submitted to the
Supreme Court for adjudication in 1993. The court refused to hear the
case.
There is another, ominous aspect to this concept of Grobstein. Some
states do not require consent from both parents for a pregnant minor to
get an abortion. Who then would constitute the "community" and who
would become the "custodian"? Read on!
"Third, if acceptable custodianship based on kinship has not been provided for
a given pre-embryo, it should become the responsibility of a designated public
authority, which may appoint a trustee to make suitable decisions on behalf of the
pre-person, with priority given as indicated in the preceding first principle.
Fourth, if all possibilities for providing continued development to personhood
have been exhausted, a pre-person may be made available for other purposes
(my emphasis) approved under rules to be formulated and monitored by a
publicly responsible oversight body."

This is perhaps the most odious statement made, yet. In pre- World
War II Nazi Germany, the mentally defective, Pastors, Priests, Gypsies &
others were declared "non persons" and routinely executed It is the
"Second Holocaust': which is rarely written about, and included more
than 10,000,000 people. 21 Is there a parallel here with the infamous Nazi
medical experiments in the WWII concentration camps? Jews, Russian
PO WS, Polish inmates and even some Germans were considered
"nonpersons" and thereby useful in yielding information presumed
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beneficial for soldiers in the field or for the good of science.
The fact that we have, on the one hand Nazi authority, and on the other,
federally sanctioned guidelines by the Ethics Comminee of the American
Fertility Society, experimenting on "nonpersons': makes no difference. In
both cases the objectives were and are driven by an abject denial ofmoral
imperative.
"Fifth, it is assumed that such pre-persons will be maintained in an optimal
frozen state pending disposition - but that they will not be so maintained for
periods longer than one year unless accumulating experience indicates otherwise.
Careful records should be maintained for all individual pre-embryos so as to allow
modification of the one-year preliminary recommendation in response to
cumulative experience.
"These principles are intended to apply to pre-embryos as pre-persons, the
developmental stage most often dealt with in clinical centers providing in-vitro
fertilization and related techniques for treating subfertile couples. This set of
applications does not, however, exhaust the growing possibilities for beneficial
intervention during development in utero whether the benefit be to the mother or
the offspring. There is, therefore, growing need for greater scientific understanding
of both embryonic and fetal development to support these clinical possibilities."
• Preembryos are now embryos
"Thus, the first point made earlier with respect to the status of pre-embryos is
equally valid for embryos - it is essential both to protect their potential as
prepersons and to better understand the nature and properties of such potential.
We need therefore to define the status of embryos so that their pre-personhood is
appropriately respected, while allowing knowledge about them to be effectively
expanded."
This seems contradictory. Grobstein says that "it is essential both to
protect their potential as pre-persons and to bener understand the nature._
of such potential "
Which has priority? The best way to protect the "potential of prepersons" is to permit no intervention so they can be born! Further,
Grobstein equates pre-embryo with pre-person and states "the status of
pre-embryos is equally valid for embryos':· that is, "pre-persons are not':
according to Grobstein, "automatically and immediately persons"!
This is the very concept placed before the NIH advisory panel on
Human Embryo research in the spring of1994. As we read on we shall see
how Grobstein claims the entire embryonic period (his definition up to 7
weeks P-F) may be subjected to human embryo research.

"The embryonic period can be defined as beginning with the appearance of the
head-to-tail body axis and extending to the onset of bodily movement at six to
seven weeks. The main body axis is first recognized by appearance of the so-called
primitive streak in the cup-shaped layer of cells which, ten to fourteen days after
fertilization represents the nascent embryo. Shortly thereafter, in line with and
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ahead of the primitive streak, the neural folds appear as the first visible precursor of
the central nervous system and the brain."

Grobstein is reinventing human embryology. All traditional teaching in
human embryology has heretofore taught that the embryonic period ends
and the fetal period begins on or about the ninth week of development
postfertilization. based on three things occurring at that time: 1) more
rapid development of the face, 2) completion offormation of all major
organ fields, and 3) the onset of differentiation of the reproductive
structures.
• A new definition for the transition of embryo to fetus
"... By six to seven weeks, neuromuscular connections have been established in
the neck region sufficient to support primitive turning movements of the head.
This is a reasonable marker for the transition from primary organogenesis of the
embryo to fetal growth and maturation, which continues on to birth and beyond."

Simply, not so. Turning of the head is not a reasonable marker for
transition from embryo to fetus. First, it is in direct contradiction to what
has been previously accepted and taught Second, there is the vague
inference here that turning the head may suggest such psychological traits
as query, curiosity or willful response. There is no evidencefor such veiled
inferences. In fact at 5 to 6 weeks, limbs and/or head may move in
response to two stimuli· 1) chemical, effecting a change in tissue balance
of0 2 and CO:l and 2) mechanica~ including that produced by a surgeon's
probe. A consortium of sarcomeres (contractile units) in differentiating
voluntary muscle is probably not necessary for this kind of movement,
because many cells contain microfi/aments, which represent primitive
contractile systems.
Grobstein's not-so-veiled inferences are "The New Wave" of science.
"Movement, particularly when it seems purposeful, has significant impact on
observers; accordingly, at the much later time of quickening, this was a traditional
clinical sign of advancing pregnancy and fetal well-being. Today, embryonic
movement is visible to ultrasonography as early as six to seven weeks of gestation
and affords welcome testimony about fetal welfare. Moreover, movements imply
a significant level of maturation, including the presence of receptors, neural
.transmitters, and effectors such as muscles. Thus movement as behavior, even
when rudimentary, becomes a potential form of communication and thus an
indicator of an internal state that may later include the beginnings of sensation,
awareness, and comfort - all assumed to require at least minimal brain function."

There is nothing really inco"ect in what is said here. However,
Grobstein has probably justified Bernard Nathanson's claims in his
production of 'The Silent Scream"!
However, it should be said that Grobstein's use of the word
"purposeful" is a rather long reach, and has no scientific support. In fact,
applying this eve~ to the newborn is suspect
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"With these developments, concern legitimately rises about influences and
treatments that may evoke pain or other significant discomfort. Very much more
knowledge about these matters is needed to deal intelligently and humanely with
the "rights" of quasi-persons during their course to full subjective existence."ll

• Added value through added signals
"Recapitulating, although the human developmental course is gradual and
cumulative, there are several fundamental horizons that are recognizable as major
transitions. These include, in addition to fertilization, embryonic axis formation
and onset of behavior as indicated by bodily movement Each signals a new level
of organization and integration, which canjustify assignment of added value with
regard to realized function and imminent social potential."
Each does signal a new level of organization and integration. But it
does notfollow that "added value" means value to the political or social
structure ofthe society in which the embryo is developing. This is specious
and arbitrary, because "added value" may apply to any stage, including
newborn (which in the past were subjected to infanticide in some cultures)
or adult (decreased value of which is prompting aided death by
Kevorkian).
Because ofthe continuum character ofdevelopment, stages or ever new
levels of differentiation are important only in a taxonomic way to human
embryologists and obstetricians.
" .. . even at birth full independence as a person is still some years ahead.
Nonetheless, in most contemporary societies full protection as a person is
mandated for any newborn. Yet, the fetus, particularly in its early stages, is a far cry
from a normal newborn, and no general consensus has been achieved on when in
fetal life in utero a person definitely exists. There is, however, consensus that any
fetus capable of survival after delivery ("viable") is a person from the time of
delivery."

Grobstein finally admits that not even birth confers full "personhood"
upon an individuaL Thus, assigning this socio-legal quality at any time is
simply arbitrary. The only consensus that viability and personhood are
linked is that ofa majority ofthe Supreme Court arrived at in 1973 in Roe
v. Wade.
" . .. What seems clear is that there is no moment or single step when, or by
which, a person in the full sense suddenly exists. Rather, a human being in the full
sense gradually emerges through a series of steps, with no way of progressing
immediately from a pre-person to a person. Nonetheless, each step makes a
contribution, and we do not yet fully understand all of the steps or exactly how
each contributes. Some steps can be clarified by study of other species, but no other
species undergoes the full changes that are so diagnostic of humanity."

He contradicts himself, because this means that not even his arbitrary
stage of "developmental individuality" confers personhood, nor does birth.
nor does puberty.
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". . . Clearly needed is wider awareness that essentially ideological
considerations are pinching off an important area of biomedical research - an
area involving critical aspects of reproduction and development."

• "Family of value issues"
"To summarize the problem in the context of this book, experience has taught
us that a number of ethical issues regularly arise in the conduct of scientific
research. At the primary level this book presents much about misrepresentations of
data, the responsibilities of authorship, and the conflicts of interest that may arise
when scientists function in centers of national policy or in corporate board rooms.
These indeed are important issues and call for careful attention.
"But there is another family of value issues that has plagued the interaction of
science with society for centuries, perhaps as long as the two have existed."

I believe it is not by accident that Grobstein uses the phrase 'Jamily of
value issues': This is a thinly veiled attempt to establish some sense of
credibility, not to mention ethical and moral value to his gratuitous tone by
offering a contorted syntactical phraseology of 'Jamily values':
Traditional family values are the bedrock of societal stability. He knows
that; therefore, he makes a rather lame attempt to invoke this concept
"It has to do with the product of science rather than its methods or even its
objectives. To attach value to scientific knowledge often means to detach value
from what was previously thought to be reliable knowledge."

Therefore, the end, indeed, would justify the means.
". . . The firm belief that a complete person begins at conception and that,
consequently, both contraception and abortion are moral equivalents to murder
rests on supposed knowledge from which value now has to be detached. The much
more difficult present reality that a person emerges gradually in compticated ways
from a single cell is knowledge to which value now has to be firmly attached.
Neither the substance of this relatively new knowledge nor the evidence that
supports it is easily communicated throughout the body politic. Nonetheless, it
must somehow become part of the scientific and technological literacy, which we
are all urged to share more widely with the general community."

Embryology does not stop at birth. The fundamental processes of
embryology are continued even into old age and death. This is so because
all oflife is a continuum. Therefore, the human, the person, the individual
are all identical in the conceptual sense.Hence, the value of life is
established at the initial contact of sperm and ovum and cannot be
"detached" because of a self-serving or arbitrary reinvention of human
embryology.
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